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European Patterns of
Development in Historical
Perspective
A B S T R A C T
Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing empirical regularities of growth
since, to a large extent, its countries share institutions, policies, and resource
endowments. Patterns of development, which associate structural change
with variations in GDP per head and population, are constructed for modern
Europe (18501990) along the lines of Chenery and Syrquin’s pathbreaking
work. Thus, it is possible to discern whether a common set of development
processes is observable for the whole continent and whether countries that
had a late start exhibited, as suggested by Gerschenkron, a differential
behaviour in terms of accumulation, resource allocation, and demographic
transition. The results tend to confirm the different nature of latecomers’
development.
Key words: Chenery and Syrquin, Gerschenkron, latecomers, modern Europe, patterns of
development
‘Quid rides? mutato nomine de te fabula narratur’
Horace, Satires, I, i, v. 69
The search for an optimal path of development, usually associated with the
German Historical School, goes back to the Classical economists and can be
traced back to the philosophers of the Enlightenment.1 Adam Smith suggested
a stage approach to historical development, and Karl Marx twice quoted
Horace’s verses to emphasise the extent to which Britain’s industrialising
experience forecasted the future of Germany, by then, a latecomer.2 After World
War II economists once more became interested in long-term growth and
1 Cf. O’Brien, D.P., The Classical Economists. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975; Meier, G. &
Baldwin, R.E., Economic Development. Theory, History, Policy. New York: Wiley 1957; Schumpeter, J.A.,
History of Economic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1954.
2 Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 1976; Marx, K., Das Capital. London 1867. As Marx wrote in his preface, ‘the
industrially more developed country presents to the less developed country a picture of the latter’s
future’.
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9
turned to history in the search for a laboratory of natural experiments.3 Stylised
facts, short cuts towards the optimal path of development, were explored
during the Golden Age (195073) by a generation of applied, historically
minded economists.4 One of their achievements was the construction of
patterns of development that, in the Clark/Kuznets tradition, are rooted in
stylised facts but lack an a priori model.5
Modern Europe provides a sound basis for testing empirical regularities of
growth as it offers a consistent and homogeneous set of countries that have
largely shared resource endowments, institutions, and economic policies.
Nonetheless, the economic map of Europe over the last two centuries shows,
as Gerschenkron expressively put it, ‘a motley picture of countries varying with
regard to the degree of their backwardness’ and these initial differences have been
‘of crucial significance for the nature of subsequent development’ as economic
structure, institutions, and ideologies all vary directly because of them.6
The purpose of this paper is to put the existence of a common path of
development in modern Europe to the test with the help of the stylised patterns
of structural change designed by Chenery and Syrquin.7 Nonetheless, the fact
that countries that had a late start would follow a different path of
development with respect to early starters will also be taken on board.8 The
divergence between early starters and latecomers originates in their structure of
production that results, in turn, from different institutions that substituted for
the missing prerequisites of the first wave of industrialisation.9 In other words,
we will examine whether latecomers utilised their ‘advantage of backwardness’
to leapfrog certain phases that early starters went through.
3 Cf. McCloskey, D.N., Does the past have useful economics?, in Enterprise and Trade in Victorian
Britain. Essays in Historical Economics, Ed. D. N. McCloskey. London: George Allen and Unwin 1981.
4 Clark, C., The Conditions of Economic Progress. London: Macmillan, 2nd edition 1957; Lewis, W.A.,
Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor, The Manchester School, vol. 22, 1954,
139191; Kuznets, S., Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New Haven: Yale
University Press 1966; Kuznets, S., Economic Growth of Nations. Cambridge, Mass.: Bellknap 1971;
Chenery, H.B., Patterns of Industrial Growth, American Economic Review, 50, 1960, 624654;
Chenery, H.B. & L. Taylor, Development Patterns: Among Countries and Over Time, Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 50, 1968: 391416; Rostow, W.W., Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-
Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960; Denison, E.F., Why Growth Rates
Differ. Postwar Experience in Nine Countries. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 1967,
pioneered a positive approach to the determinants of economic development.
5 That is, ‘income-related changes for which the available evidence suggests considerable uniformity
but for which there is yet no well defined body of theory’. Chenery, H.B. & Syrquin, M., Patterns of
Development, 19501970. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1975, 6.
6 Gerschenkron, A., Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book of Essays. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 1962, 353. We cannot presume, therefore, that European countries went
throughout similar stages of development a´ la Rostow. Cf. the pathbreaking work of O’Brien, P.K. &
C¸. Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France (17801914). Two Paths to the Twentieth Century.
London: Allen and Unwin 1978.
7 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development.
8 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness.
9 As Chenery pointed out, latecomers exhibit significant differences that ‘stem from the existence of the
advanced countries as sources of technology, capital and manufactured imports, as well as markets
for exports’. Chenery, H.B., Transitional Growth and World Industrialisation, in The International
Allocation of Economic Activity, Ed. B. Ohlin et al. London: Macmillan 1977, 458.
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The existence of distinctive development patterns for different epochs in
Modern European history, such as the liberal era prior to World War I, the neo-
mercantilist interwar Years, and the post-World War II return to liberalism, will,
therefore, be investigated by widening the scope of the paper to include both
the nineteenth and the twentieth century. Furthermore, the existence of clusters
of countries (Core or early starters and Periphery or latecomers) that shared
structural features will be also explored and, thus, Gerschenkron’s qualifica-
tions about the distinctive paths of development followed by early starters and
latecomers will be revisited.10
Our results differ from those provided by Chenery and Syrquin, Crafts, and
Branson, Guerrero and Gunter, not only because of the wider time coverage but
also the allowance for regime changes through the estimation of ‘adjusted’
patterns.11 It is worth stressing that the historical approach in a relatively
homogeneous region, such as Europe, that combines cross-section and time
series data provides a superior choice to the usual cross-section analysis for the
recent past, in which low-income countries are associated with early phases of
development regardless (over-time and cross-country) of differences in
preferences and tastes.12
A Chenery and Syrquin Approach to European
Development Patterns
Modern economic development is seen as an identifiable process of growth and
change, whose main features are the same across countries13 and can be
defined as ‘an interrelated set of long-run processes of structural transformation
that accompany growth’.14 A structural transformation consists of a set of
10 The paper follows the lead established two decades ago by I. Adelman & C. T. Morris, Patterns of
Economic Growth, 18501914; or Chenery-Syrquin in historical perspective, in Economic Structure
and Performance, Essays in Honor of Hollis B. Chenery, Ed. M. Syrquin, L Taylor & L. E. Westphal. San
Diego: Academic Press 1984; and N.F.R. Crafts, Patterns of Development in Nineteenth Century
Europe, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 36, 1984: 438458, to cover earlier epochs than the statistically
convenient late twentieth-century world, usually neglected by development economists. Crafts,
Patterns of development, 449, already perceived in nineteenth-century Europe Gerschenkronian
‘tendencies towards a different kind of structural change in the later developing countries’.
11 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development; Crafts, Patterns of Development; Branson, W.H.,
I. Guerrero & B.G. Gunter, Patterns of Development, 19701994, World Bank Working Paper 1998.
12 Cf. Branson, Guerrero & Gunter, Patterns of development, for the latest substantive addition to this
literature.
13 Solow, R.M., ‘Comment’ to H.B. Chenery ‘Transitional Growth and World Industrialisation’, in The
International Allocation of Economic Activity, Ed. B. Ohlin et al. London: Macmillan 1977, 491. The
rationale for this approach, as exposed by Kuznets, S., On Comparative Study of Economic Structure
and Growth of Nations, in The Comparative Study of Economic Growth and Structure. New York: NBER
1959, 170, ‘is conditioned on the existence of common, trans-national factors, and a mechanism of
interaction among nations that will produce some systematic order in the way modern economic
growth can be expected to spread around the world’.
14 Syrquin, M., Patterns of structural change, in Handbook of Development Economics, Ed. H. B. Chenery &
T. N. Srinivasan. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1988, 2 vols, I, 205. A more comprehensive definition
of economic development has been put forward by Adelman & Morris, Patterns of Economic
Growth, 46, as ‘the process of institutional transformation by which structural change is achieved and
gains and losses are distributed’.
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9
changes in the composition of demand, production, trade, and employment,
each reflecting different aspects of shifts in resource allocation that take place as
income levels rise. Thus, a development pattern may be defined as any
systematic variation in the economic and social structure associated with a
rising level of per capita income. Structural changes interact with the pattern of
productivity growth in a general equilibrium system to determine the rate and
pace of growth.15
In the patterns of development framework, each country is treated as an
integrated, interdependent component of the international economy. Such an
assumption is acceptable in Modern Europe only after the mid-nineteenth
century, once the basis of the liberal international order was established. By
then, however, more than three centuries of mercantilism, warfare and
experience with internal and imperial markets had left the countries of Europe
at rather diverse levels of development.
The patterns of development approach has been subjected to systematic
criticism.16 It has been argued that the Chenery-Syrquin equations are derived
from an unspecified model of development in which we cannot tell supply
from demand determinants. Moreover, development patterns do not reveal a
unique path to industrialisation since comparative advantage, policy and
institutions matter. A country’s trade and production patterns, as Bhagwati
reminded us, are ‘the result of an interaction between the country’s own
endowments and demands and the rest-of-the-world’s endowments and
demands’, a fact apparently not accounted for in the Chenery patterns.17 The
challenge, therefore, would instead be to assess ‘the ability of an economy to
reach its full potential, that is, to come close to optimal growth’.18 Another
objection relates to the econometric approach as causality may run in either
direction: from the level of per capita income to the structural variable or vice-
versa and, in fact, an endogeneity problem could arise as the structural variable
associated with the per capita GDP level is often a conventional determinant of
economic growth.19
In the development patterns, however, there is no implication that a single
unique path, through which all economies have to pass, has to exist. On the
contrary, Chenery and his associates were always aware that by treating
development within a uniform framework, systematic differences in national
15 Syrquin, M., Growth and Structural Change in Latin America, Economic Development and Cultural
Change, vol. 34, 1986: 433454.
16 Cf. for instance, Diaz Alejandro, C., Review of Patterns of Development 19501970 by M. Chenery and
M. Syrquin, Economic Journal, 86, 1976: 401403. Williamson, J.G., The Constraints of
Industrialization: Some Lessons of the First Industrial Revolution. Proceedings of the Eighth
International Economic Association World Congress, New Delhi 1986 (mimeo) wrote, ‘in uncritical
moments we tend to gauge an economy’s performance by its ability to replicate or even exceed those
stylized patterns’.
17 Bhagwati, J.N., Comment to H. B. Chenery ‘Transitional Growth and World Industrialization’, in The
International Allocation of Economic Activity, Ed. B. Ohlin et al. London: Macmillan 1977, 491.
18 Williamson, Constraints of Industrialization.
19 Cf. the discussion in Branson, Guerrero & Gunter, Patterns of Development.
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development patterns would be identified.20 In fact, they distinguish between
two components of a country’s pattern of development: the normal effect of
universal factors (which accounts for most of the observed structural variation
among countries) and the effects of a country’s individual history (which can
be more readily evaluated after allowing for the uniform elements in each
development pattern).21
A feasible way to approach historical reality is, as Gerschenkron put it,
through the search for certain regularities or uniformities, and the analysis of
deviations from the norm.22 Since development occurs with sufficient
uniformity among countries to produce a consistent pattern of change in
resource allocation, factor use, and other structural features as the level of per
capita income rises, a set of basic processes restricted only by the lack of
empirical evidence has been selected.23 All variables are expressed as shares (of
GDP, total employment, etc.) since it is the relative variation that determines
structural change. Shares are calculated at nominal prices since the decisions of
individuals and firms are more meaningfully analysed at current, rather than at
constant, prices. The development processes studied can be divided into three
main categories: a) accumulation, which deals with the resources used
to increase an economy’s productive capacity, for which we have gathered
information on stocks (literacy) and on increases in stocks (gross domestic
investment and school enrolment); b) resource allocation, which interacting
with accumulation, produces systematic changes in the composition of
domestic demand, foreign trade, production and employment, as real product
per head rises; c) demographic transition.24 Here they are summarised:
1. Domestic Demand (percentage of GDP): gross domestic investment,
private consumption and government consumption.
2. Education: primary and secondary school enrolment (percentage of
population aged 5 to 19) and literacy (percentage of population over 7
years old).
3. Output Structure (percentage of GDP): value added in agriculture,
industry (including mining, construction and utilities) and services.
4. Labour Allocation (percentage of total labour force): labour force in
agriculture, industry and services.
5. Foreign Trade (ratio to GDP): exports, imports, openness (exports plus
imports), primary exports and manufactured exports.
20 As Chenery, H.B., Structural transformation: a program of research, in The State of Development
Economics. Progress and Perspectives, Ed. G. Ranis & T.P. Schultz. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986, 60, put
it, ‘the search for uniform features of development almost inevitably leads to a division of countries
into more homogeneous groups’.
21 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development; 5.
22 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness.
23 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 11.
24 As Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 33, put it, ‘these patterns result from the interaction
between the demand effects of rising income and the supply effect of changes in factor proportions
and technology’.
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6. Urbanisation (percentage of population in towns of over 20,000
inhabitants).
7. Demographic transition: crude birth and death rates (per thousand
inhabitants), gross fertility (children per woman), infant mortality (per
thousand births) and net fertility.25
Data on structural change across Europe during 18501990 have been
gathered mostly from national sources, in particular from reconstructed
national accounts (see Appendix on sources) for three-year averages around
years ending in 0 from 1850 to 1900; then, for significant benchmarks in the
interwar period (1913, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1938) and for years ending in 0 and
5 during 19501990. A major feature of the data set is that non-market
economies have been excluded given the conceptual and data problems
involved (different economic categories, low reliability, and, especially, a
different set of incentives for economic agents).26 Countries included appear in
Table 1.
GDP per head is expressed here in 1990 Geary-Khamis ‘international’ dollars
and national series have been built by projecting backwards from 1990 levels
using each country’s growth rates (taken from historical national accounts).
Regrettably, the resulting series suffer from a serious index number problem,
since their economic meaning weakens as we move away from the 1990
benchmark.27
Methodology
In this section the econometric methods used for the construction of patterns
of development are exposed. We start from the method designed by Chenery
and Syrquin and since the statistical procedure has to be applied to a wide
range of structural processes and countries, the scope for a more refined
econometric specification is constrained by the availability of data.28
In addition to confirming the existence of patterns of development common
to modern Europe, a major goal of this essay is to separate the effects of
universal factors, common to all countries, from particular characteristics of
each one, in order to highlight national deviations from the European patterns
of development. I, therefore, assume that any indicator of structural change, Iit,
for icountry, and ttime period, can be divided into two different parts:
25 Net fertility(1infant mortality rate) * gross fertility.
26 The choice of 1990 as the end year in this investigation is due to the fact that the demise of
communism in Europe changed borders and was followed by a transition to the market in central
and eastern European countries that were not included while they were command economies and
accumulation and resource allocation were not ruled by market forces. Thus, this paper cover the late
nineteenth century (18501913) and, to use Hobsbawn’s expression, ‘the short’ twentieth century
(19141990).
27 Prados de la Escosura, L., International Comparisons of Real Product, 18201990. An Alternative
Data Set, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 37, 2000: 141.
28 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development. Branson et al., Patterns of Development, faced the same
constraint for the last quarter of the twentieth century.
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(1) Iitf1[aUit]f2[bi;Vit]
where a is a k+1 vector of time and cross-country invariant parameters; Uit is a
vector of explanatory variables representing the level of development, market
size, economies of scale, etc. in country i at period t; bi is a time invariant but
cross-country variant vector of parameters; and Vit represents a set of
explanatory variables, including a stochastic disturbance (which incorporates
war, political unification, etc.). Uit includes the explanatory variables used by
Chenery and Syrquin,29 to which others for country size and a time-trend
component have been added:
(2) U0it [c; LnYit; (LnYit)
2; LnNit; (LnNit)
2; Mit; LnSizei; TRENDt]
where c is a constant term; Yit, real income per head; Nit, population; Mit, net
imports as a share of GDP; Sizei, country i’s area in square kilometres; TRENDt,
time trend dummy.
Under these conditions, f1(a,Uit) will be the part of the structural variable Iit
that can be explained by the pattern of development common to all countries,
while the divergence of country i from the pattern will be f2(bi,Vit). Then,
assuming that a exists amounts to accepting that a common pattern does exist.
Next the necessary assumptions to estimate the patterns of development
properly have to be established. We have preferred the semi-log to the double-
log formulation in order to retain the additive property for the different
components of aggregates (i.e., the sectoral shares of output must add to 100).
In addition, it will be assumed that f1(a,Uit)a*Uit. Under these conditions,
we have:
Table 1 Countries included in the regressions (18501990)
Austria
Belgium
Czechoslovakia, 19131938
Denmark
Finland since 1860
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary, 18701938
Italy, since 1860
Netherlands
Norway, since 1870
Portugal
Russia, 18801913
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland, since 1880
U.K.
29 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 1618.
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(3) Iita0a1LnYita2LnY
2
ita3LnNita4LnN
2
ita5Mit
a6LnSIZEia7TRENDif2 (bi; Vit)
Income per head works as an overall index of development and as a
measure of output. Population represents the market size and captures the
effect of economies of scale and transport costs on patterns of production and
trade. These effects are independent of the income level, since no correlation
is expected between market size and level. In addition, quadratic terms are
included to allow for non-linearities. In our sample, each country’s popula-
tion size changes substantially as our time coverage is of one and a half
centuries, and a new country-size variable that represents the area of the
country helps to control for this, while it works at the same time as a country-
dummy. The time-trend variable should capture universal changes over time
not associated with the other independent variables (e.g., institutions,
policies, etc.) that affect all countries alike. The time-trend dummy eliminates
all variation between time periods so that the original panel data sample can
easily be treated like a simple pool of cross-section data, as regards the
econometric approach.
The target now will be to estimate the [a0; a1; a2; :::; a7] vector. For this
estimate to be consistent, we will assume that there is no correlation between
variables included in Uit and Vit. This is a very strong assumption that may not
be true in practice and, therefore, one must be very cautious when interpreting
the econometric results.30 If such an assumption holds true, we will be able to
isolate additively and consistently the part of the structural variable that can be
explained by a common pattern of development, and obtain f2(bi,Vit) as a
residual that measures the particular divergence of each country’s structural
indicator from the pattern.
The formulation described so far is what we will call the single pattern
because the time-varying regressors are supposed to have homogeneous
effects on each structural variable over the whole time span. A second and
more historically relevant approach has been introduced to test and, in its
case, to detect the existence of structural changes in the constant term and in
the slopes of LnY and LnN in different sub-periods of our sample. This
method allows us to go beyond the time-trend dummy that stands for an
exogenous uniform shift but is unable to discriminate between periods.31 The
outcome is the adjusted pattern. Three historical periods were chosen to test
structural breaks: the period prior to World War I, the interwar years, 1920
1938, and the post-World War II period up to 1990. To allow for different
possibilities of structural change over these historical periods, dummy
variables are defined in Table 2.
30 To avoid this problem, it could have been assumed that VitVi, t and f2 (bi,Vi)bi’*Vi. This linear
specification would permit the elimination of the term f2 (bi,Vi) taking deviations with respect to the
mean in the time-varying dimension (within-group estimator). But, in that case, we would also get
rid of a0. This would not present a major problem if we were sure that a0 is really a constant because,
in such a case several estimation techniques could be used consistently. However, it is easy to guess
that a0 will present several structural changes in its long time-varying dimension, and testing this
hypothesis is another goal of this essay. For such a reason, we finally decided to assume the lack of
correlation between Uit and Vit, and to go on with the initial specification.
31 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 154.
Scandinavian Economic History Review.....................................................................................................
194
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 C
ar
lo
s 
II
I 
of
 M
ad
ri
d]
 A
t:
 0
8:
32
 1
4 
Ju
ly
 2
00
9
Regression Analysis
The econometric results for both single and adjusted patterns deserve some
comments.32 The main finding is that existence of patterns of development
common to modern European countries appears to be confirmed. Adjusted
R-squared and statistical tests indicate so. If accumulation and resource
allocation processes are examined we can find, for example, that as regards
the composition of demand, both coefficients of income and population
present the expected sign, as income is negatively related to consumption (total
and private) and positively to domestic investment, while the opposite occurs
with population. Size and trend dummies also correlate positively to invest-
ment and negatively to consumption (only to private consumption for the time
trend). Larger countries appear to invest more at given levels of income and
investment rates increase as time goes by, regardless of income (while the
opposite happens to private consumption). In the adjusted patterns, a dummy
variable for the slope of LnY in different periods allows us to locate structural
breaks, from which it emerges that for investment, as could be expected, the
estimated coefficient of income reached the highest value in the post-World
War II era, and the lowest in the interwar years. The same happens (but with a
negative sign) to private consumption, with larger absolute values for the post-
1950 period, and a positive coefficient for the interwar years.
The supply side offers the expected correlation between income and
population on the one hand, and agricultural shares in output and employ-
ment on the other, i.e., negative for income and positive for population, while
a positive one appears for industry shares in output and employment with
respect to income.33 When the estimated coefficient of the quadratic term
shows an opposite sign to that of the linear term, it means that the relation
Table 2 Structural change tests: dummy variables
D13: value 1 from 1820 to 1913, and 0, thereafter.
D2090: value 0, 18201913; 1, 19201990.
D38: value 1, 18201938; 0, thereafter.
D5090: value 0, 18201938; 1, 19501990.
D2038: value 0, 18201913 and 19501990; 1, 19201938.
LnY13 D13*lnY
LnY38D38*LnY
LnY2038D2038*LnY
LnN13 D13*lnN
LnN38D38*LnN
LnN2038D2038*LnN
32 The regression results are provided in Prados de la Escosura, L., Gerschenkron Revisited. European
Patterns of Development in Historical Perspective, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Papers
0579 (10) 2005, available from: http://docubib.uc3m.es/WORKINGPAPERS/WH/wh057910.pdf
33 When quadratic terms exist, the resulting overall value has been obtained by weighting coefficients
for quadratic and non-quadratic terms with income values ranging from 1,000 to 15,000 US dollars
at 1990 prices (PPP). No clear relationship appears for population and industry shares in output and
employment (positive for the single pattern, negative for the adjusted pattern). For services shares,
there is a negative correlation for population, while for income it is negative only for the single
pattern.
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between structural change and income level attenuates as GDP per head rises.
The time-trend and size dummies show a positive sign for agricultural shares in
output and employment, independently of the level of income (while the
opposite is observed for industry). In the case of agriculture, the estimated
coefficient for income, negative, is higher in absolute terms for the period prior
to World War I (as the adjusted coefficients reveal).
Urbanisation, as expected, is positively related to income and population and
also to net imports (a proxy for capital inflow), while it is negatively correlated
to the country’s size. Human capital indicators (school enrolment and literacy)
consistently show positive correlations with income and negative ones with
population and size. The time trend appears to be positive for primary and
secondary schooling although the income coefficient was higher before World
War I.
The demographic transition shows the expected negative relation to income
for birth and death (including infant mortality). For the adjusted pattern,
fertility (both gross and net) is positively related to income. Such a result
suggests that findings for the post-1960 world, i.e., a negative relation between
net fertility and income,34 cannot be simply extrapolated to earlier periods in
which economic development helped to reduce infant mortality and, therefore,
increased net fertility. A clear negative time trend appears for all demographic
indicators.
Finally, foreign trade indicators unanimously show a positive relation to
income (with larger estimated coefficients as time goes by), and a negative one
to population and size, as well as a negative time trend that suggests that
latecomers tend to be less open at similar income levels. The positive link
between population and manufacturing exports is the exception and might
suggest a Linder scenario of representative demand, in which producing
industrial goods for home consumption appears as a prerequisite for exporting
them.35
Normal Structural Variation with the Level of
Development
Table 3 presents the structural transformation that occurs as real GDP per head
grows. Simulations are provided for all development processes within an
income range from 1,000 to 12,000 dollars (at 1990 ‘international’ prices),
when most of the transition from a pre-industrial to a modern society occurs.
Three development processes are considered, i.e., accumulation, resource
allocation and demographic transition. Together with the normal structural
change associated with a rise in GDP per head, growth elasticities have been
computed for given levels of per capita income and its changes (Table 4).
Most development processes were half-completed at early stages of develop-
ment, somewhere in between 3,000 and 4,000 dollars, and four-fifths of the
34 Barro, R.J., Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106,
1991: 407443.
35 Linder, B., An Essay on Trade and Transformation. New York: Wiley 1961.
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Table 3 Normal variation in economic structure with the level of development. Predicted values at different income levels, 1990 Geary-
Khamis $
Processes 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000
Accumulation
Investment (% GDP)
Saving 6.5 11.0 13.7 15.6 17.1 18.3 19.3 20.2 21.0 21.6 22.3 22.8
Investment 8.3 12.4 14.8 16.5 17.8 18.9 19.8 20.6 21.3 21.9 22.5 23.0
Capital inflow 1.8 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Education (%)
Literacy 51.1 65.8 74.3 80.4 85.1 89.0 92.2 95.1 97.6 99.8 100.0 100.0
Schooling 31.7 41.1 46.6 50.5 53.6 56.1 58.2 60.0 61.6 63.0 64.3 65.5
Resource allocation
Demand (% GDP)
Private consumption 87.7 80.1 75.7 72.5 70.0 68.0 66.3 64.9 63.6 62.4 61.4 60.4
Govt. consumption 5.8 8.8 10.6 11.9 12.9 13.7 14.4 14.9 15.5 15.9 16.3 16.7
Production (% GDP)
Agriculture 44.6 33.2 26.4 21.7 18.0 15.0 12.4 10.2 8.3 6.5 5.0 3.5
Industry 26.4 29.8 31.8 33.2 34.3 35.2 36.0 36.7 37.2 37.8 38.2 38.7
Services 29.0 37.0 41.8 45.1 47.7 49.8 51.6 53.1 54.5 55.7 56.8 57.8
Labour Force (%)
Agriculture 65.7 50.1 41.0 34.6 29.5 25.5 22.0 19.0 16.4 14.0 11.9 9.9
Industry 21.1 25.9 28.7 30.6 32.2 33.4 34.5 35.4 36.2 36.9 37.6 38.2
Services 13.2 24.0 30.3 34.8 38.3 41.1 43.5 45.6 47.4 49.1 50.5 51.9
Urbanisation (%)
Urban population 12.6 22.6 28.5 32.7 35.9 38.5 40.8 42.7 44.4 45.9 47.3 48.6
Relative Labour Productivity (%)
Agriculture 68.0 66.2 64.5 62.7 60.9 58.8 56.4 53.7 50.5 46.5 41.6 35.3
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Table 3 Normal variation in economic structure with the level of development. Predicted values at different income levels, 1990 Gearyamis $
Processes 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000
Trade (% GDP)
Exports of goods 11.6 15.4 17.6 19.1 20.3 21.4 22.2 22.9 23.6 24.1 24.6 25.1
Primary exports 11.6 10.9 10.0 9.4 8.9 8.6 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3 7.1
Manufactured exports 0.0 4.5 7.6 9.7 11.4 12.8 14.0 15.0 15.9 16.6 17.3 18.0
Imports of goods 10.9 16.0 18.9 21.1 22.7 24.0 25.2 26.2 27.0 27.8 28.5 29.1
Openness 20.5 31.4 36.5 40.2 43.0 45.4 47.4 49.1 50.6 51.9 53.1 54.2
Demographic transition
Birth rate (o/oo) 33.2 27.7 24.5 22.2 20.4 19.0 17.7 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.5
Death rate (o/oo) 22.2 18.6 16.4 14.9 13.7 12.8 11.9 11.2 10.6 10.0 9.5 9.1
Rate natural
Increase (o/oo)
11.0 9.1 8.1 7.3 6.7 6.2 5.8 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.4
Fertility 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9
Infant mortality (o/oo) 186.8 136.8 107.5 86.7 70.6 57.4 46.3 36.6 28.1 20.5 13.6 7.3
Net fertility [Fertility* [1Infmort/1000]] 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9
le 3 (Continued)
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Table 4 Normal variation in growth elasticities with the level of development.
Predicted values at different income levels, 1990 Geary-Khamis $
Point Elasticities* Discrete Elasticities**
Processes 1000 2000 4000 8000 10004000 40008000
Accumulation
Investment (% GDP)
Saving 0.632 0.373
Investment 0.71 0.48 0.36 0.29 0.496 0.320
Capital inflow
Education (%)
Literacy 0.41 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.327 0.242
Schooling 0.43 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.336 0.249
Resource allocation
Demand (% GDP)
Private consumption 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.137 0.160
Govt. consumption 0.80 0.50 0.37 0.30 0.518 0.324
Production (% GDP)
Agriculture 0.37 0.50 0.76 01.62 0.520 1.089
Industry 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.165 0.145
Services 0.40 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.319 0.236
Labour Force (%)
Agriculture 0.34 0.45 0.65 1.18 0.463 0.840
Industry 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.268 0.210
Services 1.18 0.65 0.45 0.34 0.699 0.390
Urbanisation (%)
Urban population 1.15 0.64 0.44 0.34 0.688 0.385
Trade (% GDP)
Exports of goods 0.47 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.361 0.262
Primary exports     0.152 0.251
Manufactured exports  1.67 0.78 0.50 1.639 0.629
Imports of goods 0.55 0.38 0.28 0.23 0.477 0.312
Openness 0.62 0.41 0.32 0.26 0.486 0.289
Demographic transition
Birth rate (o/oo) 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.48 0.290 0.411
Death rate (o/oo) 0.24 0.28 0.36 0.47 0.288 0.412
Fertility 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.285 0.431
Infant mortality (o/oo) 0.39 0.53 0.83 1.97 0.554 1.244
Net fertility [Fertility*
[1Infmort/1000]]
0.20 0.23 0.27 0.34 0.220 0.348
*Computed as oxt ;yt
a1  2a2lnYt
xt
; where a1 and a2 are the coefficients for lineal and quadratic terms
of income (Yt) in the regression, and xt is the predicted value corresponding to the level of income at
which the elasticity is being computed.
**Elasticities with respect to GDP per head computed from Table 3 by dividing log differences:
[Ln XT/X0/Ln YT/Y0]
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transformation had occurred at an income of 8,000 dollars.36 The interesting
implication is that growth in post-World War II Europe, the period from where
most economic theorists derived their stylised facts, is weakly related to
resource allocation.37
In the accumulation process, proxies for physical and human capital have been
considered. Information on GDP expenditure components permitted us to derive
net imports of goods and services as a residual that, in turn, proxied capital net
inflow, and, as a result, to derive the rate of national saving (expressed as a share of
GDP). The comparison between investment and saving suggests a life-cycle
behaviour, in which domestic saving is lower than investment demand at initial
levels of the transition, with the gap closing as income rises. In both cases, the
share of GDP increases as income rises, multiplying over the total income range
considered by 3.5 in the case of saving (2.4 times up to $4,000, the mid-transition
point), and by 2.8 in the case of investment (2.0 up to $4,000), that is,
representing a gain of 16.3 percentage points for saving, and 14.7 for investment
(9.1 and 8.2 by $4,000, when half the transition was completed). Proximate
indices for human capital also show large increases, multiplying by 2 over the
whole transition (1.6 by half of it), that is, up to 52.5 percentage points for
literacy, and 33.8 for schooling, (29.3 and 18.8 up to $4,000).
Associated with growth, there are structural shifts in the allocation of
resources. Resource allocation interacts with factor endowments, economic
policies and productivity growth to condition the path of development. Overall
consumption fell by 20 per cent throughout the transition (10 per cent when
half of it was achieved); that is, declining from over 90 per cent of aggregate
demand to around three-fourths. Trends in private and government consump-
tion followed, however, opposite directions, while the former fell by 31 per
cent, the latter rose by 188 per cent (17 and 105 per cent, respectively, over
the first half of the transition). In percentage points, the variations represent
27.3 percentage points of decline for private and 10.9 of rise for public
consumption (15.2 and 6.1 by half the transition).
On the supply side, a decline occurs in agriculture’s shares in output and
employment, while, for industry and services, there is an increase. It is worth
mentioning that absolute increases are more noticeable in the shares of services
(28.8 and 38.7 percentage points gained for output and employment,
respectively, over the transition) than for industry (12.1 and 17.1, respectively),
in particular, at higher income levels (over $4,000). Agriculture’s supremacy in
output and employment disappears by $3,000 and $4,000, respectively.
Interestingly enough, the proportional change implied by the transition differs
from output to employment. It means that relative average labour productivity
(that is, the ratio of each sector’s share in output to that in employment) differs
across sectors and, consequently, that efficiency improvements in the use of
labour do not proceed at the same pace across sectors. In agriculture, a sharper
36 Pro-memoria, A per capita income of $4,000 was reached by the U.K. in the 1890s, and by France in
the mid-1920s; a level of $8,000 was reached by the UK or Germany in the early 1960s; and $12,000
was the income of France and Germany in the early 1970s. Maddison, A., The World Economy. Paris:
OECD 2006.
37 Such an empirical fact reinforced perhaps the neoclassical assumption that adjustments within the
economy were immediate and frictionless.
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decline can be noticed for output share (41.1 percentage points) than for
employment share (55.8) (where a relative and, then, an absolute decline is
experienced), which explains why the productivity gap widens as income rises.
The lagged shift of labour out of agriculture due to the low mobility of the
workforce, as it is the case when surplus labour in agriculture exists, helps to
explain the productivity gap. Besides, partial productivity differences appear in
most industrialisation experiences as investment and technological change
occur more often in modern industry and services.38 Had all sectors the same
production function, average labour productivity would equalise across them,
given the same factor prices and complete resource mobility for all. Data
constraints, however, do not allow the addressing of differentials in marginal
productivity. A caveat to be made about relative labour productivity derives
from the weakness of statistical data for employment in agriculture. In fact, at
lower income levels, when the division of labour is not widely diffused yet,
figures for the economically active population in agriculture (the main
historical source for employment) tend to be over-exaggerated, as part-time
labourers in industry and services tend to register under their main professions,
e.g., farmers and, hence, figures for industry and services are understated.39
The share of population living in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants is the
arbitrary threshold used here to assess the degree of urbanisation. A rapid
increase in urbanisation takes place as income rises. A multiplier of 3.9 applies
for the entire transition (2.6 for half of it), representing a rise of 36 percentage
points (20 up to $4,000). Besides, a decline in the proportion of agricultural
labour within rural population (measured as the ratio of the agricultural share
in total employment to the rural share in total population) occurs as GDP per
head improves, suggesting that people living in the countryside tend to work
increasingly outside agriculture as economic growth proceeds (from three
quarters to one-fifth over the transition).
Development patterns for international trade help us to search for the sources
of a country’s comparative advantage and its changes as income grows.
Historically, natural resource endowments, factor proportions and economic
policies have conditioned trade specialisation. Examination of trade patterns
shows a close link between the rise in GDP per head and that of the ratio of
trade to GDP (a gain of 33.7 percentage points for openness, that is, exports
plus imports), though the gain of imports exceeds that of exports. A possible
explanation for the latter would be that as their income grows, countries
become competitive in services, like nineteenth-century Britain, or attractive to
foreign capital, like Spain between the 1850s and the 1880s.40 Changes in
38 Cf. Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 48.
39 Cf. Federico, G., Feeding the World. An Economic History of Agriculture, 18002000. Princeton:
Princeton University Press 2005, and O’Brien, P.K. & Prados de la Escosura, L., Agricultural
Productivity and European Industralization, 18901980, Economic History Review, vol. 45, 1992: 514
536. Adjustment for actual days worked would further reduce the size of labour force in agriculture.
Cf. Prados de la Escosura, L. & Rose´s, J.R., The Sources of Long-run Growth in Spain, 18502000,
CEPR Discussion Paper 6189, for an exploration of the Spanish case.
40 Imlah, A.H., Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica. Studies in British Foreign Trade in the XIXth
Century. Harvard: Harvard University Press 1958; Prados de la Escosura, L., La posicio´n internacional
de la economı´a espan˜ola, 18501935: nueva evidencia sobre la balanza de pagos, Universidad Carlos
III 2007 (mimeo).
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comparative advantage from primary production to manufacturing are revealed
by the composition of exports as income grows. Manufactured exports exceed
those of primary goods at incomes of around $4,000. Meanwhile, industry’s
share of GDP becomes larger than agriculture’s at $3,000. Such a lag suggests
that in Europe, the emergence of a domestic market for industrial goods
preceded that of foreign markets.
Finally, the demographic transition suggests a decline in both birth and death
rates, in which the former experienced a deeper absolute fall, resulting in a
slowing down in the rate of natural increase (by 6.6 percentage points), as
income per head improves. Meanwhile, a decline in gross fertility is softened in
net terms by the more rapid reduction in infant mortality.
So far only tendencies have been pointed out. Table 4 provides a more
precise measurement of the responsiveness of structural transformation to
changes in GDP per head for each development process. Elasticities have been
computed both at a given level of per capita income (point estimates) and for
income changes (discrete estimates), covering most of the transition from a pre-
industrial to a modern economy. In both estimates the lower the income level,
the higher the value of the coefficient for growth elasticity, with the exception
of those cases in which a negative relationship exists, where the opposite
occurs. Differences in the structural response to increases in income are worth
noticing. Both measures of (absolute) elasticities are higher, at lower income
levels, for investment and government consumption, the share of services in
total employment and urbanisation and manufactured exports, while the
opposite occurs for agriculture’s shares in output and employment, fertility
(gross and net), infant mortality and crude birth and death rates.
Revisiting Gerschenkron: Early Starters’ and
Latecomers’ Development Patterns
Up to this point, the discussion has been carried out on the basis of
development patterns common to Modern Europe over one and a half
centuries. However, when one and a half centuries is being considered,
distinctive structural behaviour during different historical periods should be
expected. The adjusted patterns of development allow for historical differences
in structural change across different phases (from the mid-nineteenth century
up to World War I, in the interwar years, and in the post-World War II era) and,
therefore, help to distinguish the features of early starters and latecomers. A
similar approach to the one used in the construction of average single patterns
has been followed for the adjusted patterns. As an illustration, the patterns of
development and growth elasticities are presented for the pre-World War I era
in Table 5 and Table 6. For the sake of simplicity, only the $1,000- $4,000
income range has been considered, as most European countries had not
reached the upper level by 1913.
Gerschenkron provided a set of propositions that can be tested with the help
of the adjusted development patterns.41 Thus, he asserted that, the more
41 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness. This is done, however, at the risk of confusing the notion of
‘backwardness’ with that of ‘lateness’.
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backwards a country is, a) the faster the growth of industrial output; b) the
more intense the stress on the size of both industrial plant and enterprise; c)
the greater the stress upon producers’ goods; d) the stronger the pressure on
private consumption levels; e) the greater the role of institutional factors in
promoting industrialisation (banks, the State), and f) the less active the role of
Table 5 Pre-1914 normal variation in economic structure with the level of
development. Predicted values at different income levels, 1990
Geary-Khamis $
Processes 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Accumulation
Investment (% GDP)
Saving
Investment 8.8 10.1 11.1 11.8 12.4 12.9 13.3
Capital inflow
Education (%)
Literacy 33.7 50.7 62.8 72.2 79.8 86.3 91.9
Schooling 28.2 34.9 39.6 43.3 46.3 48.8 51.0
Resource allocation
Demand (% GDP)
Private consumption 84.7 83.1 82.0 81.2 80.5 79.9 79.4
Govt. consumption 6.2 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.6
Production (% GDP)
Agriculture 47.9 40.5 35.3 31.2 27.9 25.1 22.7
Industry 25.5 27.2 28.3 29.3 30.0 30.7 31.2
Services 26.6 32.3 36.4 39.5 42.1 44.2 46.1
Labour Force (%)
Agriculture 67.6 56.4 48.5 42.3 37.3 33.0 29.3
Industry 17.4 22.6 26.2 29.0 31.3 33.3 35.0
Services 15.0 21.0 25.3 28.7 31.4 33.7 35.7
Urbanisation (%)
Urban population 7.7 16.4 22.7 27.6 31.5 34.9 37.8
Relative Labour Productivity (%)
Agriculture 70.8 71.8 72.8 73.8 74.8 76.0 77.2
Trade (% GDP)
Exports of goods 9.8 14.7 18.3 21.0 23.3 25.2 26.8
Primary exports 9.8 11.5 12.1 12.5 13.0 13.3 13.5
Manufactured exports 0.0 3.2 6.2 8.5 10.3 11.9 13.3
Imports of goods 6.8 12.5 16.4 19.6 22.1 24.2 26.1
Openness 16.6 27.2 34.7 40.6 45.4 49.4 52.9
Demographic transition
Birth rate (o/oo) 34.6 32.1 30.4 29.0 27.8 26.9 26.1
Death rate (o/oo) 24.1 22.6 21.5 20.6 19.9 19.3 18.8
Rate natural increase (o/oo) 10.5 9.5 8.9 8.4 7.9 7.6 7.3
Fertility 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9
Infant mortality (o/oo) 194.8 174.0 159.3 147.9 138.5 130.6 123.9
Net fertility [fertility*
[1Infmort/1000]]
3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.4
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Table 6 Pre-1914 normal variation in growth elasticities with the level of
development. Predicted values at different income levels, 1990
Geary-Khamis $
Point Elasticities* Discrete Elasticities **
Processes 1000 2000 4000 10004000
Accumulation
Investment (% GDP)
Saving 
Investment 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.298
Capital inflow
Education (%)
Literacy 1.24 0.67 0.46 0.724
Schooling 0.58 0.41 0.32 0.427
Resource allocation
Demand (% GDP)
Private consumption 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.047
Govt. consumption 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.147
Production (% GDP)
Agriculture 0.38 0.52 0.80 0.539
Industry 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.146
Services 0.53 0.39 0.31 0.397
Labour Force (%)
Agriculture 0.41 0.57 0.94 0.603
Industry 0.72 0.48 0.36 0.504
Services 1.00 0.59 0.42 0.626
Urbanisation (%)
Urban population 2.82 0.96 0.57 1.148
Trade (% GDP)
Exports of goods 1.25 0.67 0.46 0.726
Primary exports - - - 0.231
Manufactured exports - 1.64 0.77 1.866
Imports of goods 2.31 0.96 0.60 0.970
Openness 1.58 0.76 0.50 0.836
Demographic transition
Birth rate (o/oo) 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.203
Death rate (o/oo) 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.179
Fertility 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.135
Infant mortality (o/oo) 0.96 0.32 0.41 0.326
Net fertility [Fertility* [1Infmort/1000]] 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.080
*Computed as oxt ;yt
a1  2a2lnYt
xt
; where a1 and a2 are the coefficients for lineal and quadratic terms
of income (Yt) in the regression, and xt is the predicted value corresponding to the level of income at
which the elasticity is being computed.
**Elasticities with respect to GDP per head computed from Table 5 by dividing log differences:
[Ln XT/X0/Ln YT/Y0]
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agriculture in industrialisation, that is, its provision of a market for industry by
rising labour productivity.42
Unfortunately, only some of Gerschenkron’s propositions about European
development can be subjected to quantitative testing.43 The evidence presented
here provides a preliminary test if we associate hypothesis a) with the size (and
the increases) in the share of industry in output and employment; hypotheses
b), c) and d) with the shares of GDP allocated to investment and private
consumption, respectively; hypothesis e) with the share of GDP assigned to
government consumption, and, finally, hypothesis f) with the productivity gap
and the relative size of agriculture in GDP and labour force.
From the comparison between pre-1914 Europe (Table 5) and the average
single patterns of development for Modern Europe (18501990) (Table 3) with
those obtained for developing countries in the Golden Age (195070) by
Chenery and Syrquin, some interesting findings can be reported.44 As regards
propositions b) and c), accumulation of both human and physical capital
proceeded at a different pace before and after the Great War. Pre-1914
investment was lower than in Modern Europe as a whole, except at very low
income levels. The contrast with developing countries shows a similar trend but
at a lower level for Modern Europe (Figure 1).45 School enrolment was also
lower in pre-1914 Europe at the same income levels, a fact associated with the
larger role of government in the provision of services (health or education) as
we move into the twentieth century, as is confirmed by the evidence on
developing countries (Figure 2). Literacy also exhibits the same pattern at low
levels of per capita GDP but reversed the pattern as income went up (Figure 3).
Thus, lower investment rates in physical and human capital at similar income
levels for nineteenth-century Europe lend indirect support to Gerschenkron’s
contention that latecomers to industrialisation emphasised producers’ goods.
Differences between the pre-1914 period and the entire period considered
(18501990) for resource allocation processes offer an answer to propositions d)
and e). Thus, prior to 1914, the expenditure composition shows a higher
(overall) consumption above $2,000, with the share of private consumption
larger (Figure 4) and that of government consumption smaller (Figure 5) above
$1,000. Latecomers, including post-World War II developing countries, hence
42 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, 353354. A critical assessment of Gerschenkron’s views can be
found in O’Brien, P.K., Do we have a Typology for the Study of European Industrialization in the
XIXth Century?, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 15, 1986: 291333. Gerschenkron’s views
are examined in the light of research during the late twentieth century in Sylla, R. & G. Toniolo, Eds.,
Patterns of European Industrialization. The Nineteenth Century. London: Routledge 1992.
43 Unfortunately some of Gerschenkron’s propositions are left aside in this quantitative but over-
simplified exercise, including the role of investment banks or even that of the state.
44 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development.
45 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, computed patterns of development using U.S. dollars of
1964 obtained with trading exchange rates and they did it again in a later paper, this time using 1980
dollars (Syrquin, M. & H. Chenery, Three Decades of Industrialization, World Bank Economic Review,
vol. 3, 1989:2, 145181). This reduces the comparability with our estimates in dollars adjusted for
the purchasing power parity. As Syrquin and Chenery, Three decades of industrialization, 150, point
out, ‘differences across countries in incomes converted at [trading] exchange rates tend to exaggerate
the real differences in income’. In order to carry out the comparison with Chenery and Syrquin,
Patterns of Development, estimates we re-scaled their income levels to 1990 U.S. dollars using the U.S.
implicit GDP deflator.
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suffer from a higher pressure on private consumption while public consumption,
usually correlated to the state’s activist role, was larger, as Gerschenkron asserted.
The supply side shows noticeable differences for the pre-1914 patterns and
provides responses to propositions a) and f). Before the Great War, European
agriculture presents a larger share of GDP for any income level (Figure 6) and a
Figure 1 Investment (% GDP) in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe and
developing countries.
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Figure 2 Education enrolment (%) in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe and
developing countries.
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9
smaller share of the labour force above a $1,000 income (Figure 7), than
Modern Europe as a whole and developing countries after 1950. As a result, a
lower productivity gap appears and tends to close as income rises. In other
words, the lagged shift of labour out of agriculture and the higher productivity
gap (Figure 8) confirm Gerschenkron’s contention that latecomers’ agriculture
had a less active role in economic growth.
Figure 3 Literacy (%) in pre-1914 europe and modern Europe.
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Figure 4 Private consumption (% GDP) in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe
and developing countries.
1000 2000 3000 4000
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
Modern Europe (1850–1990) Pre-World War I Europe Developing Countries 1950–70
European Patterns of Development.....................................................................................................
207
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Un
iv
er
si
ty
 C
ar
lo
s 
II
I 
of
 M
ad
ri
d]
 A
t:
 0
8:
32
 1
4 
Ju
ly
 2
00
9
Lower shares of GDP for industry and services (the latter up to $3,000) and
higher shares of employment (over $1,000 in the case of industry though not
in the case of services in post-1950 developing countries) complete a more
balanced labour allocation prior to the Great War than in later periods.
Furthermore, in the pre-1914 era a more urbanised society as income grows
Figure 5 Government consumption (% GDP) in pre-1914 Europe, modern
Europe and developing countries.
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Figure 6 Agriculture (% GDP) in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe and
developing countries.
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Figure 7 Agriculture (% EAP) in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe and
developing countries.
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Figure 8 Relative agricultural average productivity in pre-1914 Europe,
modern Europe and developing countries (average labour produc-
tivity in the economy1).
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(above $2,000) (Figure 9) and a rural population less dependent on agriculture
appear at the same levels of income. However, as contended by Gerschenkron,
a more intense industrial growth is observed in the case of latecomers whose
relative industrial output grew faster within the same income range.
Differences in international trade also appear between the patterns of
development of pre-1914 Europe and Modern Europe, as the former exhibits
a more open economy (over $1,000) as would be expected during the first
globalisation (Figure 10) in which the larger share of manufacturing ex-
ports reveals its comparative advantage (Figure 11). The systematic commodity
trade surplus of the early starters, in contrast with the deficit of the latecomers
(Figure 12), points to a higher investment demand than domestic saving in the
case of latecomers both in Modern Europe and in post-1950 developing
countries, and can be illustrated for the cases of Britain, France and Spain in the
nineteenth century.46
Higher birth and death rates, and slightly lower population pressure below
$4,000, plus higher fertility (Figure 13) and infant mortality (Figure 14), are the
main demographic differences exhibited by the comparison between pre-1914
and Modern Europe (18501990) when compared with average, single
patterns. The lower fertility in the case of latecomers does not seem to match
higher investment in human capital (Figure 2 and 3), as suggested in the new
growth literature,47 and points to the increasing role of government as provider
of social services during the twentieth century. The contrast with post-1945
Figure 9 Urbanisation rate (%) in pre-1914 Europe and modern Europe.
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46 Imlah, Pax Britannica; Prados de la Escosura, Posicio´n internacional; Levy-Leboyer, M., La balance des
paiements et l’exportation des capitaux franc¸ais, in La position international de la France Aspects
e´conomiques et financiers XIXe-XXe sie`cles, Ed. M. Le´vy-Leboyer. Paris, Editions EDHESS 1977.
47 Barro, R.J., Determinants of Economic Growth. A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T.
Press 1997, 2225.
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developing countries lends support to this hypothesis and shows a higher rate
of natural increase in population (Figure 15) associated with the fall in
mortality due to exogenous health improvements.48
Comparing growth elasticities for each structural variable at given income
levels, or as income increases for different historical phases, is most illuminat-
ing. Values (in absolute terms) for both measures of elasticity for the pre-World
War I era are shown in Table 6. The comparison with those for Modern Europe
(Table 4) shows lower elasticity values for both the shares of investment and of
industry in GDP in the income range $1,0004,000. It might be suggested that
such a result is associated with the latecomers’ catching up with the early
starters and lends support to Gerschenkron’s propositions a), b), and c).
Nonetheless, larger growth elasticity for human capital formation and for
openness, two ingredients of successful industrialisation, are exhibited in the
pre-World War I patterns. Moreover, a much lower value of the growth
elasticity for government consumption in early starters tends to confirm the
idea of the government’s stronger position in latecomers. Finally, the higher
(absolute) value of the growth elasticity for the agricultural share in employ-
ment and for the urbanisation rate among the early starters reinforces the view
of a less dynamic rural sector in the case of latecomers. It can be inferred, then,
that Gerschenkron’s stylised patterns of European development are not rejected
by the empirical evidence provided here.
Gerschenkron’s propositions would be better tested, perhaps, if instead of
looking at ‘adjusted patterns’ that allow for differences between historical
Figure 10 Exports/GDP ratio in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe and
developing countries.
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48 Easterlin, R., How Beneficient is the Market? A Look at the Modern History of Mortality, European
Review of Economic History, vol. 3, 1999: 3, 257294; Riley, J.C., The Timing and Pace of Health
Transitions Around the World, Population and Development Review, vol. 31, 2005:4, 741764.
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epochs, countries’ trajectories were considered and, hence, ‘country-adjusted
patterns’ were considered.49 We could draw, then, over the entire time span
considered (18501990), a distinction between early starters and latecomers to
industrialisation or, in modern development terminology, between Core and
Periphery.50 The empirical use of these concepts presents obvious difficulties,
namely, a country could have an early start but stagnate later, and ending up as
part of the Periphery. As a compromise, we have carried out a quantitative
exercise in which we arbitrarily split European countries between Core or early
starters, and Periphery or latecomers, according to their relative position to
Britain, the European leader up to the post-World War II years. Thus, those
countries that, by 1950, had never reached a level of per capita income similar to
that of the United Kingdom by 1913, were considered part of the Periphery,
otherwise they were assigned to the Core.51 Unsurprisingly, the results obtained
from comparing normal variations in development processes for Core and
Figure 11 Manufactured exports/GDP ratio in pre-1914 Europe, modern
Europe and developing countries.
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49 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development; Crafts, Patterns of development, and Branson et al.,
Patterns of Development, distinguish between country groups.
50 A word of caution is needed. The search for uniform features leads to a further division of countries
into more homogeneous clubs that, in the end, might only represent alternative development
strategies.
51 The following countries are included in the Periphery: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Russia and Spain. Since only market economies have been
considered, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been excluded since 1950, and Russia since 1920.
Patterns of development for Core and Periphery have been estimated through an econometric
procedure identical to the one applied to the entire pool of countries and the econometric results for
both single and adjusted patterns are available from the author upon request.
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Periphery largely confirm those resulting from the contrast between the
patterns of pre-1914 Europe and Modern Europe.
The main findings of the comparison between Core and Periphery, which
tend to confirm Gerschenkron’s views, can be easily summarised.52 Although at
low income levels Core countries exhibit a higher rate of human and physical
capital formation, such an advantage disappears as income rises, and Peripheral
countries reach higher investment in physical and human capital. On the
demand side, consumption remains higher in the Core, and its government
consumption only catches up with the Periphery’s at high income levels. On
the supply side, the Core exhibits a smaller agriculture and larger industry and
services, both in terms of output and employment. The agricultural productiv-
ity decline, relative to the economy’s average, is larger in the Periphery, and the
differential gap widens as income rises. The lagged shift of labour out of
agriculture in the Periphery confirms Gerschenkron’s intuition of a weaker
agricultural contribution to economic growth among latecomers.
A higher degree of openness is observed in the Core while in the Periphery a
larger (commodity) trade deficit appears, suggesting that as income grows, a
larger inflow of capital (as percentage of GDP) takes place in the Periphery.
Lastly, the demographic transition proceeds at a faster pace in the Periphery
with a more rapid decline for mortality and, at higher income levels,
population pressure is stronger in the Periphery.
Figure 12 Trade balance/GDP ratio in Pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe and
developing countries.
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52 The regression analysis and the development patterns over the 1990 $1,00012,000 income range are
available from the author upon request.
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Concluding Remarks
In this paper European development patterns that associate structural change
with variations in GDP per head and population have been examined in
historical perspective. Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing regula-
rities of growth since its countries share a common set of institutions, policies,
and resource endowments. Some lessons can be derived.
Figure 13 Gross fertility (children per woman) in pre-1914 Europe and
modern Europe.
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Figure 14 Infant mortality rate (0/00) in pre-1914 Europe and modern Europe.
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Patterns of structural change, constructed along the lines of Chenery and
Syrquin’s pathbreaking work, confirm the existence of a common set of
development processes associated with rising per capita income for the whole
of Europe. However, discernable development patterns for different epochs
(observed with the adjusted patterns) confirm Gerschenkron’s perception that
early starters and latecomers followed their own paths of economic moder-
nisation.
Differences between stylised features of development in early starters and
latecomers raise interesting questions for further research. Are latecomers
penalised by the fact that, at the same level of income per head, their
investment and consumption shares in GDP are larger and lower, respectively,
than for an early starter? Or do such differences result from a wider range of
investment opportunities?53 Demonstration effects and the awareness that a
higher rate of investment helps to catch up are perhaps behind such a
differential. As Gerschenkron put it, ‘the opportunities inherent in industria-
lization ( . . .) vary directly with the backwardness of the country’.54
Chenery and Syrquin reminded us that ‘the analysis of the uniformity of
development patterns constitutes a first step towards identifying the sources of
diversity’.55 Each country’s deviations from the estimated patterns at a given
level of income per head and population are associated with country-specific
characteristics such as resource endowments, institutions, and policies, and the
Figure 15 Natural population increase in pre-1914 Europe, modern Europe
and developing countries (0/00).
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53 Besides, in recent times larger investment seems to be required to achieve economies of scale and
scope in modern industry and services.
54 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, 8.
55 Chenery & Syrquin, Patterns of Development, 64.
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extent to which such a differential behaviour in accumulation, resource
allocation, and demographic transition is behind the distinctive performance
of latecomers deserves to be fully investigated within the framework of modern
growth literature. This way Gerschenkron’s idea that latecomers could
substitute for missing prerequisites could be tested.
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merce, transport and communications, banking and private services, and public
administration). Figures are provided in the form of percentages of the total
labour force from Bairoch et al., Working Population, Flora, State, Economy and
Society, Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, and OECD, Labour Force
Statistics, 19691990. Paris: OECD 1992. National figures were completed with
Lains, Growth in a Protected Environment, and Nunes, A.B., A evoluc¸aˆo da
estrutura, por sesos, da populac¸aˆo activa en Portugal -um indicador do
crecimento econo´mico (18891981), Ana´lise Social, vol. 26, 1991: 707722,
for Portugal; Toutain, produit inte´rieur brut, for France; Zamagni, V., A Century
of Change: Trends in the Composition of Labour Force, 18811981, Historical
Methods, vol. 44, 1987: 3697, and Vitali, Vitali, O., Aspetti dello sviluppo economico
italiano alla luce della ricostruzione della popolazione attiva. Roma: ISTAT 1970, for
Italy; Prados de la Escosura, Progreso econo´mico, for Spain.
Foreign Trade
Figures for exports and imports are from Bairoch, P., Commerce exte´rieur et
de´veloppement e´conomique de l’Europe au XIXe sie`cle. Paris: Mouton 1976; Kuznets,
S., Quantitative Aspects of the Economic-Growth of Nations, X: Level and
Structure of Foreign Trade: Long-Term Trends, Economic Development and Cultural
Change, vol. 15, 1967: 2; Mitchell, International Historical Statistics; OECD,
National Accounts; OECD, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade. Paris: OECD 1992.
For Portugal figures are derived from Nunes, A.B., Mata, E. & Valerio, N.,
Portuguese Economic Growth 18331985, Journal of European Economic History,
vol. 18, 1989: 291330. Spanish figures are from Prados de la Escosura, Progreso
econo´mico, and Tena, A., Sector exterior, in Estadı´sticas Histo´ricas de Espan˜a. Siglos
XIX-XX, Eds. A. Carreras and X. Tafunell. 3 vols., Madrid: Fundacio´n BBVA 2005,
II, pp. 573644.
With respect to manufactured export figures, we used Maizels, A., Industrial
Growth and World Trade World Trends in Production, Consumption and Trade in
Manufactures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1963; Batchelor, R.A.,
Major, R. L. & Morgan, D. A., Industrialisation and the Basis for Trade. The
National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1980; Baldwin, R.E., The Commodity Composition of Trade:
Selected Industrial Countries, 19001954 Review of Economics and Statistics, 40,
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1958, 5071; Spiegelglas, Spiegelglas, S., World Exports of Manufactures, 1956
vs. 1937, Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, vol. 27, 1959: 111
139; Deutsch, K.W. & Eckstein, A., National Industrialization and the Declining
Share of the International Economic Sector, 18901959, World Politics, vol. 13,
1961: 267299; Lamartine Yates, P., Forty Years of Foreign Trade. A Statistical
Handbook with Special Reference to Primary Products and Under Developed
Countries. London: George Allen and Unwin 1959; and Kuznets, Quantitative
Aspects. Data for particular countries were completed with Prados de la
Escosura, L., De imperio a nacio´n. Crecimiento y atraso econo´mico en Espan˜a (1780
1930). Madrid: Alianza 1988, and Progreso econo´mico; Tena, Sector exterior, for
Spain; Davis, R., The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade. Leicester:
Leicester University Press 1979, and Schlote, W., British Overseas Trade from
1700 to the 1930’s. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1952, for United Kingdom; Levy-
Leboyer and Bourguignon, L’e´conomie Francaise, and Toutain, J.C., Les
structures du commerce exte´rieur de la France, 17891970, in La position
international de la France Aspects e´conomiques et financiers XIXe-XXe sie`cles, Ed. M.
Le´vy-Leboyer. Paris, Editions EDHESS 1977, pp 5374, for France; Eddie, S.,
The terms and patterns of Hungarian foreign trade, 18891913, Journal of
Economic History, vol. 37, 1977: 329358, for Hungary; Lains, P., Os Progressos
do Atraso. Uma Nova Histo´ria Econo´mica de Portugal, 18421992. Lisbon:
Imprensa de Ciencias Sociais 2003, for Portugal, and Capanna, A. and O.
Messori, Gli scambi commercials dell’Italia con 1’estero. Roma:? 1940, for Italy.
Education
School enrolment refers to population attending primary and secondary school
as a percentage of total population between the ages of 5 and 19. Figures are
from Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, Flora, State, Economy and Society,
World Bank, WORLD BANK (various years). Social Indicators of Development.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, UNITED NATIONS (various years).
Statistical Yearbook. New York: U.N.; UNESCO (various years). Statistical
Yearbook. Paris: Unesco. As regards Literacy, it represents the percentage of
literate population (those who can read and write) with respect to total
population above the age of 7. In this case, figures are from Flora, P., Historical
Process of Social Mobilization: Urbanization and Literacy, 18501965, in
Building States and Nations, Eds. S.N. Eisenstadt & S. Rokker. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage 1973, pp. 213258; Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, and Hayami
and Ruttan, International Historical Statistics. For Italy, Zamagni, V., L’offerta di
istruzione in Italia 18611987: un fattore dello sviluppo o un ostacolo?,
Universita` degli Studi di Cassino, Dipartimento Economia e Territorio, Work-
ing Papers 4, 1993; for Spain, Nu´n˜ez, C.E., La fuente de la riqueza. Educacio´n y
crecimiento econo´mico en la Espan˜a contempora´nea. Madrid: Alianza 1992, and
Nu´n˜ez, C.E., Educacio´n, in Estadı´sticas Histo´ricas de Espan˜a. Siglos XIXXX, Eds.
A. Carreras and X. Tafunell. 3 vols., Madrid: Fundacio´n BBVA 2005, I, pp.155
244; and for Russia, Mironov, B.N., El efecto de la educacio´n sobre el
crecimiento econo´mico: el caso de Rusia. Siglos XIX y XX, Revista de Historia
Econo´mica, vol. IX, 1991:165197.
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Urbanisation
Population living in towns of 20,000 of inhabitants or more, as a percentage of
total population. Figures are from Flora, Historical Process, and State, Economy
and Society.
Demographic Transition
Birth rate and death rates are defined as the number of births and deaths per
thousand of population. Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths per
thousand births. Finally, fertility rate refers to the number of births per
thousand of female population. Figures are from Chesnais, J.C., La transition
de´mographique, Institut National d’E´tudes De´mographiques. Travaux et docu-
ments, Cahier no. 113. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1986, Mitchell,
International Historical Statistics, World Bank, Social Indicators, and World Tables.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, and United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook, New York: U.N., and for Spain, Nicolau, Poblacio´n, salud y actividad.
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